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I. State Trading and the GATT System
The post-World War II international trading system is obviously based on rules
and principles that more or less assume free market oriented economies. The
rules of GATT certainly were constructed with that in mind. 1 Yet important parts
of the world do not have economies based on these principles, and even in market
economies many institutions do not operate under free market principles, such as
state trading agencies or monopolies, government-owned industries, and the
like. These circumstances pose some difficult conceptual problems for the GATT"
trading system. Can that system continue to exist and improve if it embraces
economies and institutions that do not follow the assumed economic structure of
free markets? Should that system remain primarily one that consists of econo-
mies that are relatively "market oriented"? Should major nonmarket economies,
such as China or the Soviet Union, be incorporated into this system? And if so,
on what terms? Likewise, can this system accommodate without increasing
tension and rancor a situation where current participants have major portions of
their economies essentially outside the normal GATT-rule discipline because
these portions are government-owned or operated? In this article we will explore
these questions.
2
*Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan. This article is drawn from a book
manuscript concerning international trade policy and law, and the aspects of the U.S. law and of the
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1. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND TME LAW OF GATT ch. 2, at 35-57 (1969);
J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293-98 (2d ed.
1986).
2. See generally T. HOYA, EAST-WEST TRADE: COMECON LAW: AMERICAN-SOvIEr TRADE (1984);
M. KOSTEcKI, EAST WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM (1979); INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY:
EAST-WEST AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS (J. Nyilas ed. 1978); INTERFACE Two: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST TRADE (D. Wallace & D. Flores eds. 1982). See also
J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, ch. 21.
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First, let us examine how the GATT rules fail to accommodate the state trading
or nonmarket situation. A hypothetical case will illustrate the problem. Suppose
that the Government of Xonia maintains a state trading monopoly for the
importation of bicycles. No bicycles can be imported except through this state
trading enterprise. Suppose further that this government has accepted a binding
5 percent tariff under GATT on bicycles. In addition, it should be remembered
that the GATT prohibits the use of quantitative limitations on the importation of
bicycles (or any other goods). Thus, exporting nations might think they have an
opportunity to sell bicycles to Xonia.
Xonia may, however, as a matter of proprietary direction, inform the bicycle
trading enterprise that during the next year, it shall purchase for import no more
than one million bicycles. By such an order, Xonia has evaded the impact of
article XI of GATT prohibiting the use of quantitative restrictions. In addition,
suppose that Xonia directs the state trading enterprise that for all imported
bicycles, when they are resold on the domestic market, the markup must be 100
percent. Likewise, part of the effect of this order is to evade the tariff binding,
since the markup can partly operate like a tariff. Article II, paragraph 4, of
GATT provides that when a government maintains a monopoly on importation of
a product that has been bound, that the operation of this monopoly should not
"afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of protection provided
for . . . [under the binding]." Nevertheless, this measure has been difficult to
police. 3 In addition, many products may be unbound.
GATT article XVII addresses the problem of state trading enterprises, but its
provisions are not rigorous. Arguably, the activity mentioned in the hypothetical
above is completely consistent with GATT, even though it undermines two of the
fundamental obligations of GATT: the tariff binding and the rule against
quantitative restrictions. Article XVII requires state trading enterprises to "act in
a manner consistent with general principles of non-discriminatory treatment
prescribed in this agreement .. " This obligation has been deemed by some
interpretations of GATT to apply only as a "sort of most-favored-nation (MFN)"
measure. Such an approach argues that there is no "national treatment" article
Ill-type obligation with respect to how state trading enterprises operate. An
alternative view was mentioned in a recent GATT panel report. 4 Nevertheless,
the general thrust of article XVII of GATT is weak since it relates to the
3. See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, § 14.7.
4. Report of the Panel adopted on 7 February 1984, 30 GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 140, 163 [hereinafter GATT, BISD Sum.], on the Canadian FIRA legislation
where the Panel said:
The Panel saw great force in Canada's argument that only the most-favored-nation and
not the national treatment obligations fall within the scope of the general principles
[discriminatory treatment] referred to in Article XVII: I (a). However, the Panel did not
consider it necessary to decide in this particular case whether the general reference to
the principles of non-discriminatory treatment referred to in Article XVII: I also
comprises the national treatment principle since it had already found the purchase
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possibility of governments using state trading measures to evade the other
obligations of GATT. Needless to say, if an entire economy is based primarily on
state trading principles, such that we would call it a "nonmarket economy," then
most of the economic activity of such an economy evades the effective
responsibilities and policies of GATT, even though such an economy can be in
complete conformity with the technical rules of GATT.
Thus, several important problems face GATI'. Perhaps the most serious
problem is how to manage the acceptance into the GATT system of major
nonmarket economies. We will take that up in the next section. In addition,
however, has been the considerable criticism of the current GATT as it applies to
current Contracting Parties, allowing many Contracting Parties to evade the
GATT discipline through the use of government-owned industries and state
trading monopolies. Some proposals for legislative revision of U.S. law would
attempt to impose greater disciplines on state trading with other countries in
connection with the GATT obligations, and the whole state trading question is
one of those to be addressed during the Uruguay Round of GATT Trade
Negotiations.5 Whether it will be politically possible to tighten the discipline of
GATI concerning state trading is questionable. It is very difficult to amend the
text of GATT,6 and how one would design a separate "code" on state trading and
induce countries to accept such discipline (without any apparent advantage or
quid pro quo) is not clear.
Recent years have seen a fair amount of comment about the problem of
countertrade. 7 Countertrade describes a situation where governments or enter-
prises barter and exchange products, rather than simply paying a price for goods.
Some forms of countertrade can be accomplished through state trading enter-
prises or other government monopolies or regulations. In some cases these are set
up under bilateral treaty frameworks. Of course, countertrade can also be carried
on by purely private enterprises in a free market context, in which case, the
GATT may have rules that apply. Countertrade mandated by governments,
however, may be inconsistent with certain GATT obligations, 8 such as MFN, or
obligations prohibiting the use of quotas, or national treatment.
undertakings at issue to be inconsistent with Article II1:4 which implements the
national treatment principle specifically in respect of purchase requirements.
5. See the report of a 1988 U.S. position paper on state trading under the GATT system, 5 INrr'L
TRADE REP. 795 (1988).
6. See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, § 2.4(e).
7. Kostecki, Should One Countertrade?, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 5 (1987); see also Interface IV,
East-West Countertrade, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKTS. L. 327 (1983); Nugent, U.S. Countertrade
Policy: Is It Economically Sound?, 19 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. ECON. 829 (1985); Walsh, The Effect
on Third Countries of Mandated Countertrade, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 592 (1985); Zarin,
Countertrade and the Law, Gao. WASH. J. INr'L L. & EON. 235 (1984).
8. Gadbaw, The Implications of Countertrade Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 5 J. Coip. Bus. CAP. MARKErs L. 355 (1983); Liebman, GATT and Countertrade
Requirements, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252 (1984); see Roessler, Countertrade and the GATT Legal
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II. Nonmarket Economies and the GATT: China and the USSR
For various historical and other reasons, the GATT has always had a few
nonmarket economies as Contracting Parties. In some cases, these were nations
that were Contracting Parties to GAIT before they shifted to a nonmarket
economy structure (such as Czechoslovakia or Cuba). In other cases, the GATT!
has explicitly accepted into membership certain nonmarket economies under
special provisions or protocols (such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, and
Yugoslavia). 9 Because of these precedents, it sometimes is said that the GATT
should have no problem in accepting new nonmarket economies. Commentators
are quick to note, however, that the Contracting Parties that are nonmarket
economies in GATT! are relatively small in terms of their impact on trade.
Furthermore, relations between the GATT and its nonmarket Contracting Parties
have always been troublesome.' 0 Arguably, the trading relationship does not
work well, but the other members of GAT! are willing to tolerate the situation
because they either have special arrangements of their own with the countries
concerned, or the amounts of trade are small. Neither of these circumstances
would apply in the case of countries like China or the Soviet Union, both of
which are very large and therefore very significant in terms of potential trade
impacts in the GATT context. "
The following is a chart of the Contracting Parties in GATT which might be
deemed "nonmarket oriented," although there is much difficulty about the
definition of "nonmarket." Some countries would argue that they have a
substantial portion of their economies that operate under market and price
oriented systems, and some would argue that since the trend is more in that
direction, they should not be branded with the label "nonmarket." Commenta-
tors point out, furthermore, that even in so-called "market oriented" economies
such as those in Europe, or certain developing countries (e.g., India and Brazil),
a very large proportion of the economic resources of that nation may
System, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 604 (1985); Verdun, Are Governmentally Imposed Countertrade
Requirements Violations of the GATT?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 191 (1985).
9. With respect to the nonmarket economies that have joined GATT since its inception, see
Accession of Yugoslavia Report of the Working Party adopted on 5 April 1966, 14 GATI', BISD Supp.
49 (1967); Protocol for the Accession of Yugoslavia, July 20, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 2379, T.I.A.S. 6185,
15 GATT, BISD Supp. 53 (1968); Protocol for the Accession of Poland, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
4331, T.I.A.S. 6430, 15 GATT, BISD Supp. 46 (1968); Accession of Poland Report of the Working
Party adopted on 26 June 1967, 15 GATT, BISD Supp. 109 (1968); Protocol for the Accession of
Romania, 18 GATT, BISD Supp. 5 (1972); Accession of Romania Report of the Working Party
adopted 5 October 1971, 18 GATT, BISD Supp. 94 (1972); Protocol for the Accession of Hungary,
20 GATT, BISD SuPP. 3 (1974); Accession of Hungary Report of the Working Party adopted on 30
July 1973, 20 GATT, BISD Supp. 34 (1974).
10. See Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Non-Market Economies, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 185
(1986); Grzybowski, Socialist Countries in GAT, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 539 (1980); see also lanni,
The International Treatment of State Trading, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 480 (1982).
11. Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to the GAT, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 23 (1987);
Dirksen, What if the Soviet Union Applies to Join the GATT?, 10 WORLD ECON. 228 (1987).
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be owned and controlled by government operation, either through state trading
enterprises or directly government-owned industrial complexes. 1 2 Neverthe-
less, the countries listed below are those that are deemed to be "more
nonmarket" than the other members of GATT. The chart indicates the date of


















12. See, e.g., M. Kosrc i, supra note 2, at 43-52.










with article XXXIII. Article
XIX may be used against
Hungary on a non-MFN basis.
Withdrawal of concession
granted to Hungary possible
after negotiations.
Undertook to increase imports
at an annual rate of 7 percent.
Article XIX may be used
against Poland on a non-MFN
basis. Withdrawal of
concession granted to Poland
possible after negotiations.
Undertook to increase imports
from Contracting Parties at a
rate not smaller than growth
of total imports as provided in
Five-Year Plans. Article XIX
may be used against Romania
on a non-MFN basis.
Withdrawal of concession
granted to Romania possible
after negotiations.
Normal accession process.
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As mentioned above, in some cases trade relations between these countries,
and certain Contracting Parties of GATT, are handled under bilateral regimes,
some of which include quota measures (which may technically not be consistent
with GATT obligations). This particularly seems to be the case for the European
Economic Community. 
17
In some cases, special "safeguard measures" have been designed to try to
address the conceptual difficulties of a GATT relationship with nonmarket
economies. In the United States, for example, (as discussed in the next section)
this approach has been taken. In particular, such special safeguard measures tend
to be "selective," i.e., targeted just at the particular nonmarket economy and
thus not consistent with the general notions of article XIX of GATT and its MFN
requirement. is
China poses some particularly interesting questions, both legal and economic,
for the GATT. China was one of the original twenty-three Contracting Parties of
the GATT when it came into force under the Protocol Provisional Application at
the beginning of 1948 and so the current government in Beijing argues that China
continues to be a Contracting Party and merely needs to resume its position. The
legal situation, however, is somewhat more cloudy.' 9 During the early years of
GATT, China was in the midst of a civil war. In about 1950, the GATT
headquarters received a cable from a Chinese government then located on the
island of Taiwan, which purported to withdraw China from GATT membership.
Since that time, there has been no China that has acted as a Contracting Party in
GATT, although a government located on Taiwan took an observer position in
GAIT from 1965 to 1971. The current government of Beijing argues, however,
that the 1950 cable to GATT was null and void, because it did not originate from
the government then in control of "China." It also argues by analogy from
credentials actions taken in other international organizations such as the United
Nations and the International Monetary Fund, that the mainland Chinese
Government of today is the beneficiary of the various memberships of China in
international organizations.20
17. See, e.g., Agreement of July 28 Between the European Economic Community and the
Socialist Republic of Romania on Trade in Industrial Products (O.J. EUt. COMM. (No. L 352) 5
(1980)) and Trade and Economic Co-Operation Agreement Between the European Economic
Community and the People's Republic of China (O.J. Eut. COMM. (No. L 257) 54 (1986)).
18. See J. JAcKsoN, supra note 1, ch. 7; see also Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982
& Supp. 1988).
19. See Herzstein, China and the GATT: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China's Participation
in GATT, 18 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371 (1986); Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21
J. WoRun TRADE L. 25 (1987); see also Sheridan, The Accession to GATT of the People's Republic of
China: New Challenges for the World Trade Regime, 23 WlLNAMEr L. Rav. 843 (1987).
20. The People's Republic of China was recognized as the representative of China in the IMF on
April 17, 1980. See 35 IMF SummARY PROCEENos 99-103 (1980); see also documents regarding the
recognition of the People's Republic of China as the representative of China in the World Bank, 20
I.L.M. 777-81 (1980).
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As of mid-1988, the matter of Chinese membership in GATT had not been
resolved, but the GATT has accepted that the mainland Chinese Government will
negotiate21 for membership in GAIT, either as a new Contracting Party, or more
likely (which appears to be acceptable to most GAT members) as a resumption
of the Contracting Party position for China. Even in the latter case, however, all
parties, including China, recognize that a negotiation will proceed in GAIT
about the terms of such resumption, and that such negotiation will generally be
guided by the procedures for new members under article XXXIII of GATT.22
In fact, a pure "resumption" approach would probably be satisfactory neither
to existing GATT Contracting Parties nor to the Chinese Government. With respect
to the Chinese Government perspective, the following problems would exist:
(1) There would arguably be some back "dues" for the years for which
contributions have not been made (probably the least important of the potential
issues).
(2) The original Chinese tariff schedule of 1948 is totally out of date and
inappropriate in the modem context and would need to be revised.
(3) There might potentially be some issues of "grandfather rights" under the
Protocol of Provisional Application, but arguably there would be no grandfather
rights because current Chinese statutes (so it could be argued) are all subsequent
to the original date of the Protocol Provisional Application (January 1, 1948).
(4) Article XXXV opt-out issues are in question. The right to opt out of a
relationship with an existing GAIT member only occurs at the time of first entry
into GATT, but it appears that the current Chinese Government would want such
opt-out rights with respect to several Contracting Parties of GAIT. Likewise,
some current members of GAIT, particularly the United States, may find it
necessary to exercise opt-out rights in connection with certain legislative
problems existing in their law (we treat this issue in the next section).
As of this writing, the negotiation for Chinese reaccession has been proceed-
ing in the manner typical for new entrants under article XXXIII. Thus, the GAIT
has established a working party to consider the Chinese entry; the Chinese have
presented a statement about their economic and trading systems to the working
party; GAIT members of the working party have formulated a series of questions
(numbering more than 400) for the Chinese Government; the Chinese Govern-
ment has prepared answers to those questions; and discussion on those is
continuing. 23
The assimilation of China into GATT is a formidable task. Not only has China
been a nonmarket oriented economy (although it has argued that it is now
21. See GATT L/6017; 3 Ir'L TRADE REP. 135, 846, 915 (1986); 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 349 (1987);
see also J. Comm., July 16, 1986, at 5A.
22. Cf. Li, supra note 19, at 44-47.
23. See, e.g., 5 INT'L TRADE REP. 253 (1988), concerning the GATT Working Groups' work on
the accession/resumption of China.
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evolving towards more price and market orientation), but also China can claim
the status of a developing country with its associated special privileges in GATT.
Many producers, both in the industrialized western countries and in other major
developing countries, are eyeing potential Chinese competition with considerable
apprehension. The method by which China could be drawn into a satisfactory
GATT relationship is not easy to foresee. In all probability, it will involve a
number of different measures, embodied in a protocol of resumption. Many of
these measures may not be entirely consistent with the traditional habits of GAIT
policy makers, and may involve departures from some of the generally accepted
norms of GATT which apply primarily to market and price oriented economies.
For example, it is quite easy to conceive of special safeguard rules for Chinese
products. In addition (as we will discuss in a later section), certain special rules
regarding the so-called "unfair trade practices" will likely be necessary. With
respect to China's importing regime, other GATT members will undoubtedly
want some assurances beyond merely the acceptance of GATT and of a tariff
schedule. Already suggested have been such measures as: requiring China to
accept an obligation to unify its national customs rules and institutions; accepting
some of the Tokyo Round Codes, such as the Codes on licensing procedures, and
customs valuation; and publication of import regulations and other "transpar-
ency measures."
The China negotiation for resumption, of course, is important. Not only is
China important, but also the rules for accommodation that are worked out in the
China context will become an important precedent for future similar activities of
the GAIT, including the possible accession of the Soviet Union, and revisions of
article XVII relating to state trading.
The issue of the Soviet Union cannot be entirely ignored, despite the fact that
some GATT members would like to do so. So far Soviet overtures to the GATT
have been rebuffed, and the United States has taken a fairly strong position
against Soviet membership, or even observer status, in GAIT. The argument is
that the Soviet Union has an economy that is too different from that contemplated
by the GAIT rules, and therefore to admit the Soviet Union would do too much
damage to the fabric of the GATT system. This raises important longer-term
policy issues for the GATT and the world trading system.2 4
It is the view of this author that it will be very difficult'in the long run to
deny membership in the GAIT to any important nation of the world. Since the
GAIT is the principal world trading institution, strong arguments can be
made that it must be a universal institution, for both political and economic
reasons. Politically, it must be recognized that an important goal of the economic
institutions is the preservation of peace and the prevention of tensions that could
24. See sources cited supra note 1i.
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lead to war or other conflict. 25 An international institution that accepted all
nations of the world into an endeavor to try and accommodate respective
interests would seem an important part of that general policy. In addition,
economic considerations suggest the possible enhancement of world welfare
through the additional trading opportunities, economies of scale, and compara-
tive advantage of the general inclusion of all important trading blocks of the
world.26
Should the GATT, however, be preserved as a more purely "market oriented"
institution? Given the lack of an alternative universal trade organization, the
question then becomes how to "interface" the different economic systems of the
world into one universal organizational structure.27 Although some are tempted
to use GATT membership as a bait to try to force different national economic
systems to change, it can be argued just as strongly that the GATT has a
responsibility to change and to figure out an appropriate way to accommodate the
different economic systems. This might involve buffering mechanisms, such as
some of those suggested above in the case of China. Once again, buffering
mechanisms might involve a number of measures that are not very "pure" in the
eyes of market oriented economic policies. It is also important that these
mechanisms adequately protect the market oriented economies from abuse by the
fact that nonmarket economies and state trading agencies can too easily evade the
disciplines of the GATT rules and policies. All this is a tall order, but certainly
not an impossible one.
One possible way to develop an "interface mechanism" for nonmarket
economies in GATT, while at the same time accommodating the possibility that
portions of such economies might move towards a market orientation, would be
to establish a "two-track" safeguard system. A protocol of accession/resumption
would first likely provide for transparency (publication of regulations and
administration of customs), procedural fairness, and a working party or other
committee established under the protocol to meet annually to review problems of
the relationship. Such a review should clearly look in both directions, that is, not
only as to compliance with obligations by the nonmarket economy, but also
compliance of other GAT members in their trade relations towards the
nonmarket economy. All the other obligations of GATT would be assumed.
In addition, however, a two-track safeguard system could be provided to
operate roughly as follows: The first track would be normal GATT procedures,
which would prima facie apply to all trade, from the nonmarket or state trading
economy to other GATT members. In the absence of an explicit invocation of a
25. See R. Cooper, Trade Policy as Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD
ECONOMY 291-322 (R. Stem ed. 1986); see also J. JACKSON, supra note 1, ch. 1, especially at 9-12.
26. See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, ch. 1.
27. Id. § 10.1.
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second track, the GAIT would apply in all respects similar to the way it operates
towards other countries.
Provision would also be made, however, for a second track, by which the
government of an importing country would be allowed to set up a procedure by
which industry sectors could specially petition their government to allege that the
imports from the country covered in the protocol are "state trading exports."
When this allegation is received, it would automatically proceed towards a
second track, which would first require consultation between the importing
government and the exporting government. During this consultation phase, the
factual circumstance of the exports would be explored to see whether they were
sufficiently "state trading" in nature such that the second track should be
followed. Certain criteria could be set out in the agreement, but for practical
political purposes it would likely be necessary to give deference on this issue to
the decision of the importing country (possibly with some chance to appeal to the
committee or working party set up under the accession/resumption protocol). If
the criteria were fulfilled so that the second track would be followed, then the
importing country would apply a "serious injury test," and if the importing
country's industry was "seriously injured," and it could be demonstrated that
this was causally related (under specified causal tests) to the imports from the
state trading sector, then the importing country would be authorized to apply
selective safeguards (import restraints) on those imports.
Part of the protocol for the exporting country, however, would be a set of
restraints on the use of such selective safeguards, including a shorter time limit
(for example, three years), and possibly some quantitative prerequisites such as
the need to show that the state trading imports constituted a certain percentage
of all like product imports, as well as a certain percentage of consumption of
those products in the importing country. In addition, requirements might be
imposed that the imports from the state trading sector be increasing absolutely
(and not just relatively as permitted under the current GATT" system), and that
appropriate "adjustment measures" be taken in the importing nation. Finally,
appeal on these issues would be permitted to the GATT committee established by
the protocol of accession/resumption.
Clearly, such measures are not entirely "pure" in their economic underpin-
nings. But they might furnish a fairly pragmatic way for the GATT to
accommodate the state trading countries in a manner that would minimize the
suspicions and tensions that could otherwise occur. Furthermore, the two-track
system has the advantage of accommodating evolution in the economic system of
the state trading country. At such point in time when such a country becomes
truly a "market system," obviously the second track will not be invocable. In
between, if certain sectors of the state trading country achieve sufficient "market
orientation," they will be eligible for the full regular GATT treatment instead of
the second track.
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III. The United States and Nonmarket Economies
The United States has a special and sometimes unfortunate legal regime for its
trading relationship with "communist countries." This legal regime poses certain
problems in connection with the accommodation of nonmarket economies into
the GATT system. It stems principally from a congressional impetus in the early
1950s, as a political reaction to the Cold War. In 1951, the United States
Congress enacted a law that prohibited the United States from granting MFN
status to countries controlled or dominated by world communism.2 8 With respect
to the Contracting Parties then part of GATT, only Czechoslovakia was really
affected, but the result of the U.S. enactment was to require the United States
Government to cease to apply the GATT, at least as a de facto matter, to
Czechoslovakia. When Czechoslovakia complained to the GATT about this, the
GATI approach was to adopt a resolution that merely recognized this state of
affairs between the United States and Czechoslovakia. 29 By 1960, political
relations between the United States and some Eastern Block nations were such
that the United States was willing for Poland to enter the GATT, and willing to
establish trading relationships with Yugoslavia.
30
In 1972 the United States negotiated a bilateral trade agreement with the
Soviet Union, with the understanding that the Congress would have to approve
key actions to be taken under that agreement. When the executive branch began
to draft a potential trade bill in the early 1970s, 3 1 part of the bill authorized the
President to enter into bilateral trade agreements, including the extension of
MFN treatment, with communist countries under certain conditions. At this
point, however, an important movement in the Congress, generated by U.S.
citizens interested in the opportunity for emigration from the Soviet Union
(particularly of Jewish persons), led to the "Jackson-Vanik amendment." Under
these statutory proposals, which were included in the trade bill versions voted on
by the House and later the Senate, a communist country would be entitled to
receive MFN treatment from the United States only if it permitted free
emigration, with the possibility of a waiver if the President determined that
certain progress towards the goal of free emigration was being achieved. This
waiver was subject to various checks and actions by the Congress.32 After
prolonged negotiations between the executive and congressional branches of the
United States Government, measures were finally included in title IV of the
28. An Act to extend the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements under section
350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 50, ch. 141, § 5, 65
Stat. 73 (1951).
29. 2 GAIT, BISD 36 (1952).
30. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, at 1188.
31. Id.
32. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2439(b) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
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Trade Act of 1974.33 One result of this series of events was the rejection by the
Soviet Union of the trade agreement, since it announced that it was not prepared
to conform to the U.S. congressional measures included in the Act.
34
Thus the United States is constrained in the way that it can enter into trade
relations with communist countries. This constraint prevents the United States
from fully accepting new members of GATT when such members are "commu-
nist countries." Indeed, because of the legislation, the United States is constrained
to exercise its article XXXV opt-out of a GATT relationship with a new country
that is a communist country. Then the United States may be prepared to enter into
a bilateral trade agreement with such country, which will incorporate not only
GATT" treatment but also the essential clauses mandated by U.S. legislation,
including the congressional review of the trade relationship that must occur
annually. Needless to say, for the countries concerned this is not an entirely
satisfactory state of affairs. 
35
Another feature of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 is section 406 regarding
"market disruption," which is a special escape clause that applies only to
communist countries. To a certain extent, section 406 is partly based on a
recognition of the difficulty of applying normal unfair trade laws, such as
antidumping and countervailing duties, in the case of nonmarket economies. 36
The following countries have come under this special regime of bilateral arrange-
ment with the United States, 37 subject to title IV of the Trade Act of 1974:38
Country Date of signing Date of renewal
Romania 39  1975 1981, 1984
1987, 1988 [suspended]
Hungary40 1978 1981, 1984, 1987
China4 1  1979 1982
33. Id.; see also P. STERN, THE WATER'S EDGE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1979); Lansing & Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation
Statusfor Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 329 (1984).
34. See 72 DEP'T ST. BULL. 139-40 (1975).
35. The risk of annual review in the U.S. Congress is not particularly desirable!
36. Trade Act of 1974, § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982 & Supp. 1988); see T. VAKERICS,
D. WILSON & K. WEIGEL, ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUTY, AND OTHER TRADE ACTIONS ch. 5 (1987);
see also J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, at 586- 89; Erlick, Relieffrom Importsfrom Communist
Countries: The Trials and Tribulations of Section 406, 13 L. & POL'Y INTL Bus. 617 (1981).
37. As of July 1988.
38. Information drawn from International Legal Materials and the Federal Register. See also the
annual Operation of the Trade Agreements Program reports issued by the ITC.
39. In 1988, Romania renounced its renewal of MFN status under the Jackson-Vanik clause, see
5 INT'L TRADE RE'. 286 (1988). The U.S. State Department announced suspension of the MFN
provisions of the agreement on April 4, 1988, see 5 INT'L TRADE REP. 499 (1988). See Agreement on
Trade Relations, Apr. 2, 1975, United States-Romania, 26 U.S.T. 2305, T.I.A.S. No. 8159, 14
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The potential membership of China in GATT raises some of these same issues
for the United States Administration, which would like to support such a role. In
all likelihood the United States is required under U.S. statutes to opt out of a
China relationship and establish a GAT--type relationship by a bilateral
agreement subject to the provisions of the statute. This could be one reason why
the United States is apparently not yet prepared to accept a "resumption" legal
theory for China's entry into GATT (since the opt-out provision is only available
for new entrants). Perhaps, however, when the negotiations have proceeded
further, it may be possible for the United States executive branch to obtain some
sort of explicit change in the statute by the Congress that would permit a more
regular GATT relationship with China.
I.L.M. 671 (1975) (entered into force Aug. 3, 1975); see also Romanian Trade Agreement:
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); U.S.-Romanian Trade Agreement, Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means
Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Bilateral Commercial Agreement Between the U.S. and
the Socialist Republic of Romania, S. REP. No. 281, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (recommends
passage of S. Con. Res. 25); Extension of Non-Discriminatory Treatment to Products of Romania,
H.R. RaP. No. 359, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (recommends passage of H. Con. Res. 252); Trade
Agreement Between the U.S. and Romania, Communication from the President, H.R. Doc. No. 114,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Waiver of Trade Restrictions Against Romania, Message from the
President, H.R. Doc. No. 113, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). As to renewals, see Presidential
Determination No. 87-16 of June 24, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,931 (1987); Presidential Determination
No. 84-10 of May 31, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,025 (1984); Presidential Determination No. 81-9 of
June 2, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,921 (1981).
40. Agreement on Trade Relations, Mar. 17, 1978, United States-Hungary, 29 U.S.T. 2711,
T.I.A.S. No. 8967, 17 I.L.M. 1475 (1978) (entered into force July 7, 1978). See also MFN
Treatment for Hungary: Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); MFN Treatment with Respect to the Products of Hungary,
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment to Products of Hungary, S. REP. No. 949, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978) (recommends passage of H. Con. Res. 555); Extension of Nondiscriminatory
Treatment to Products from Hungary, H.R. REP. No. 1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess (1978)
(recommends passage of H. Con. Res. 555); 5 U.S.-Hungarian Trade Agreement, Communication
from the President, H.R. Doc. No. 318, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978); Extension of Trade
Agreements with Romania and Hungary, Message from the President, H.R. Doc. No. 345, 95th
Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978). For renewals, see Presidential Determination No. 87-15 of June 23,
1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,785 (1987); Presidential Determination No. 84-10 of May 31, 1984, 49
Fed. Reg. 23,025 (1984); Presidential Determination No. 81-9 of June 2, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg.
29,921 (1981).
41. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, China-United States, 18 I.L.M. 1041
(1979) (entered into force Feb. 1, 1980). See also Agreement on Trade Relations Between the
U.S. and People's Republic of China, Comm. Ser. No. 96-57, Subcommittee on International
Trade of the Senate Finance Committee, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); U.S.-China Trade
Agreement, Comm. Ser. No. 96-63, Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means
Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment to Products
of The People's Republic of China, S. REP. No. 549 (recommends passage of S. Con. Res. 47);
Approving the Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment to Products of The People's Republic of
China, H.R. REP. No. 733, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (recommends passage of H. Con. Res. 204);
Agreement on Trade Relations Between the U.S. and The People's Republic of China,
Communication from the President, H.R. Doc. No. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 47 Fed. Reg.
57,653 (1982).
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The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 contains a rather
intriguing provision relating to the discussion here:42 Section 1106 of that Act,
entitled "Accession of State Trading Regimes to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade," provides that before any major country with significant state
trading enterprises can enter the GATT, the United States President must
determine whether trade between the United States and that country is signifi-
cant, and if the trade unduly burdens the United States. If so, the Act provides
that the GATT rules will apply between the United States and such country only
if the state trading enterprises are conducted on a commercial basis, or (and this
is perhaps the most interesting feature) the extension of GATT rules is approved
by Congress under "fast track" procedures. This implies the possibility that in
a relatively comprehensive settlement agreement between a potential nonmarket
entrant into GATT and U.S. interests, the Congress might be willing to alter or
soften some of the existing measures of U.S. law that make it difficult for the
United States to enter into a full GATT relationship with nonmarket economies.
Clearly, a potential Soviet Union membership in GAIT also raises these
issues.
IV. Unfair Trade Practice Laws and the Nonmarket Economies:
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
The rules regarding antidumping duties and those regarding countervailing
duties are difficult (some say impossible) to apply in the case of nonmarket
economies. With respect to U.S. responses to subsidized goods and the deter-
mination of subsidies in nonmarket economies, the matter is so difficult that the
U.S. administrating authority, ultimately backed by the courts on appeal, finally
determined that the U.S. countervailing duty law did not apply to products from
nonmarket economies. This decision was based partly on the failure of the U.S.
countervailing duty statute to mention any special regime for applying counter-
vailing duties to nonmarket economies (in contrast to the dumping laws which did
so mention).43 Here we will discuss how each of these laws relates to a nonmarket
economy trade, and then discuss briefly some proposals for handling the problem.
Take first the problem of dumping. Dumping requires a comparison of the
price for export to the home market price to determine if the former is lower than
the latter, thereby creating a "margin of dumping." 44 What is the "price,"
42. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1106, Pub, L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, 1133.
43. The nonmarket economy rules with respect to antidumping actions are found in Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, amending Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)
(1982 & Supp. 1988)); see also 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1987); J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1,
at 695-98; Horlick & Shuman, Non-Market Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/Countervailing
Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807 (1984); Soltysinski, U.S. Antidumping Laws and State-Controlled
Economies, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 251 (1981).
44. See J. JACKSON, supra note I, ch. 10; see also R. DALE, ANTIDUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE
ORDER (1980); J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, ch. 10; E. VERMULST, ANTIDUmPING LAW AND
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however, in the home market of a nonmarket economy? Almost by definition,
since such economy is not based on pricing principles, the nominal price of
goods may bear little relation to prices that would be set by enterprises in a
market/price oriented economy. The prices may be set by a state planning
commission, and may vary according to the end user. Furthermore, the prices
may have little relation to the costs of an enterprise, or "profitability."
The United States has developed the practice of seeking to compile a "con-
structed cost" method of establishing the home market price, while using infor-
mation from market economies. In particular, as established in the landmark
Polish golf cart case, 5 and embellished by later cases,46 the U.S. procedure
became the following: In a case involving alleged dumping from a nonmarket
economy, the U.S. authorities would examine the product in the nonmarket
economy and establish all the various input components (parts, labor, overheads,
etc.). Then the U.S. authorities would seek a "surrogate country," which would
be a market oriented country at approximately the same level of economic
development as the allegedly dumping nonmarket economy. The U.S. authorities
would then take the list of inputs, a sort of "shopping list," to the surrogate country,
and price each of those inputs on the market of the surrogate country. With this
information it would then compile an overall constructed cost, and by adding the
statutorily mandated amounts for administration and profit (the latter being 8 percent),
the U.S. authorities would find the "home market price," which would then be
compared to the export price, in order to establish if dumping had occurred.
Needless to say, this process is cumbersome. First, a great deal can depend on
which country is chosen as a surrogate. Secondly, any country selected to be a
surrogate has little incentive to cooperate or allow U.S. investigators to enter its
territory and investigate prices there. Neither the surrogate country nor any of its
enterprises are, after all, parties to the procedure. Indeed, in one case a surrogate
country later found itself the object of a dumping investigation in the U.S., that
allegedly partly relied on the information ascertained during an earlier surrogate
procedure.47 Also, a fair amount of manipulation of the data arguably can occur,
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987); J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1966).
45. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 43; Meuser, Dumping from "Controlled Economy"
Countries: The Polish Golf Car Case, II L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 777 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket
Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987).
47. In an investigation concerning Finnish Carbon Steel Plate (49 Fed. Reg. 8973 (1984)), the
Commerce Department stated:
The allegation of sales at less than fair value of this merchandise from Finland is
supported by comparisons of the estimated Finnish home market prices (derived from
the data used by the Department of Commerce in its section 751 review of the
suspension agreement in the antidumping proceeding on carbon steel plate from Ro-
mania) with the weighted average f.a.s. Finnish port value of this product imported into
the United States .... In the Romanian case the value of the Finnish carbon steel plate
was used as a surrogate for the foreign market value of Romanian carbon steel plate.
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giving a wide latitude to administrative discretion, which can then become biased
or tilted, depending upon political aspects injected into the dumping procedure.
In any event, many feel that the process is not satisfactory.
With respect to countervailing duties and responses to subsidized goods, the
matter has been somewhat different. Countervailing duties have been imple-
mented under U.S. law against products imported from a nonmarket economy.
Until the fall of 1983, no case had been brought. Then in that year, the U.S.
textile industry brought a case alleging that textile imports from China were
subsidized and therefore should be subject to countervailing duties. 48 Partly for
reasons relating to the general, evolving political relationship of the United
States and China, the U. S. Administration was very concerned about this case.
Furthermore, the Chinese had intimated formally their distaste for the process
and indicated the possibility of counterresponses by China (such as a reduction
in the purchase of grains from U.S. farmers) if the United States actually applied
countervailing duties. The matter was further complicated because of U.S. laws
that require insulation of the administrators of dumping and countervailing duty
laws from the diplomatic and other political arms of the United States
Government. In the end, a settlement was obtained and the case was withdrawn,
but not before considerable comment and concern. 49
The next case involving nonmarket economies concerned steel wire rod
imported from Czechoslovakia. 50 In a preliminary determination the U.S.
Administration suggested that the countervailing duty law should not apply to
nonmarket economies, and in a final determination the administrators made this
finding definitive. On appeal to the U.S. courts, the Court of International Trade
overruled the Commerce Department, but then was later overruled by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5' The result, therefore, was a precedent in
U.S. jurisprudence that the countervailing duty laws did not apply to nonmarket
As an example of the self-defeating nature of Commerce's decision to initiate an action against a
previous third-market surrogate, see 48 Fed. Reg. 37,055 (1983).
48. See Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations; Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products
from The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (1983). The Commerce Department
stated that the action contained "novel issues" including whether a bounty or grant may be found in
a nonmarket economy.
49. Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from The People's Republic of China; Termination
of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,492 (1983). The termination was without
prejudice to the issues involved. Compare Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (1983).
50. Carbon Steel Wire from Czechoslovakia; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determina-
tion, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (1984). During the course of the examination of the steel wire case, two
new cases were brought and all three were decided in a similar manner and proceeded through the
appeals together. See Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union; Rescission of Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984); Potassium
Chloride from the German Democratic Republic; Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation and Dismissal of Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984).
51. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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economies. Various legislative proposals to change this have been made in the
Congress, but none have been adopted. 52
The rationale for nonapplication of countervailing duty law to nonmarket
economies bears some similarity to the dumping case problems. The Commerce
Department argued that the "subsidy" concept had no real meaning in an
economy that was not market or price oriented in the first place. In some sense,
one could argue everything was subsidized in such an economy. In any event,
there was no benchmark against which to compare the activities of economic
entities, government or otherwise, in order to ascertain the level of subsidy.
53
Since the U.S. statutory and legislative history was silent about the question of
whether the countervailing duty applied to nonmarket economies, 54 the admin-
istrators found it possible to simply rule that the law did not apply.
The conceptual problems of these and similar international trade policies as
they relate to nonmarket economies are clearly not resolved. Various proposals
have been made as to how to handle these questions, and many of these
proposals can be lumped under the rubric "benchmark approaches." 55 The
basic concept of the benchmark proposals is that the imports from a nonmarket
economy will be compared to some sort of benchmark price. Whenever the
imports are priced below the benchmark, they will be presumed to have been
dumped or subsidized, and a duty equal to the difference between the price and
the benchmark will be applied. In some proposals the presumption is
conclusive; in others it can be rebutted. In any event, the critical question is
how to set the benchmark. It was on this question that the House Ways and
Means Committee of the United States Congress floundered in trying to make a
concrete legislative proposal in 1984.56
One benchmark proposed is simply the average price in the U.S. market of
U.S.-produced goods. Obviously this method of calculation tends to be
restrictive of imports. Another benchmark proposal is to look towards the price
of imports from market economies. Still another is to look at the home market
prices in market economies for like products. An approach that seeks some
intermediate level of restrictiveness for trade is to set the benchmark equal to
the lowest average price of a substantial quantity of imports of like products
52. Section 325 of the Senate version of H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., would have used a trade
weighted average price of comparable merchandise as sold at arm's-length in the United States to
determine the foreign market value of the nonmarket economy products. The provision was not
included in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
53. For the reasoning of the Department of Commerce, see the sources cited supra note 50.
54. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55. This approach is typified by the so-called Heinz Bill. It was first proposed as S. 1966, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess (1979), and has been resubmitted subsequently under other numbers. See also, for
example, the "Hecht" proposal, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. 1064 (1987).
56. The Heinz Bill in its 1983 form (S. 1531, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983)) was adopted by the
Senate but later dropped in conference at the end of the 1984 Congressional Session.
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from a market economy. All of these approaches, of course, undermine to a
certain extent the concepts of comparative advantage, and make it harder for a
nonmarket economy to compete on the world market, at least as to price. On
the other hand, the purpose of these approaches is to assure competing
producers in importing market economies that they do not have to face
competition deemed "unfair" under long-established traditional international
trade policies. There is no easy solution, and some sort of benchmark approach
may be the "least worst" solution to the problem, at least if the benchmark is
chosen with great care.
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